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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature o(Case 
This case centers around a road dispute and boundary dispute between three adjoining 
property owners. On October 21, 2008, Plaintiffs John and Carol Hoch filed a complaint against 
Defendants Rob and Becky Vance and Defendants Jake and Audrey Sweet to enjoin the 
defendants from obstructing the plaintiffs use of a road to access plaintiffs' property. Defendants 
Vance filed an Answer and Counterclaim for quiet title and alleging trespass. 
Plaintiffs Hoch filed a motion for summary judgement alleging they had an easement over 
what the parties have generally referred to as the "upper road." The District Court found that the 
relevant warranty deeds were unambiguous and Mr. Cridlebaugh had conveyed to Dr. and Mrs. 
Hoch an appurtenant easement on the "upper road." The District Court also held that Mr. 
Cridlebaugh further conveyed to Dr. and Mrs. Hoch an easement over and across all roadways 
presently existing on Defendants Vance and Defendants Sweet property, and partially affirmed 
the Hochs motion for summary judgement. The District Court reserved for trial the issue of 
determining the precise "route or scope" of the easement and the issue of what roadways were 
presently existing on the property. 
Mr. and Mrs. Vance are appealing this order granting partial summary judgement. 
Specifically the appellants are appealing the finding that the warranty deeds granted the 
respondents an easement over the "upper road," and the District Courts finding that the warranty 
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deeds conveyed an easement over and across all roadways presently existing on the property. In 
the alternative the appellants argue the warranty deeds are vague and ambiguous. 
This appeal is primarily a question of law and centers primarily around the interpretation 
of three warranty deeds. As such it is not expected that the facts of the case will be in dispute. 
The Honorable Judge Brudie gave a detailed recital of the facts of the case and the procedural 
history of the case in his Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order. (R. Vol. II, P. 386-
391). Appellants do not wish to create unnecessary repetition and will briefly summarize the 
facts of the case. 
Jack Cridlebaugh owned ninety acres ofland in Nez Perce County. (R. Vol. II, P. 290, L. 
10). At some point he decided to divide the land into four parcels and sell it. (R. Vol. II, P. 290, 
L. 11-13). He sold twenty acres to Rob and Becky Vance on October 12, 2000. (R. Vol. II, P. 
290, L. 11 ). Approximately a year later he sold forty acres to Jake and Audrey Sweet. (R. Vol. II, 
P. 290, L. 12). On March 26, 2002, he sold twenty acres to John and Carol Hoch. (R. Vol. II, P. 
290, L. 13). At the time of the lawsuit he had retained ten acres of land. (R. Vol. II, P. 290, L. 
13). 
The property Mr. Cridlebaugh sold to Mr. and Mrs. Vance, Mr. and Mrs. Sweet and Mr. 
and Mrs. Hoch can be accessed by three private roads that run off of Stagecoach road (a county 
road). (R. Vol. II, P. 391-392, L. 11-12 & L. 22-24; Plaintiffs Exhibit 5). These three roads are 
commonly referred to by the parties as the "lower road," the "upper road," and Buckboard Lane. 
The District Court found that Mr. Cridlebaugh only had easements over the lower road and the 
upper road. (R. Vol. II, P. 392, L. 19-20). That finding is not in dispute. 
When Mr. Cridlebaugh sold Mr. and Mrs. Vance their property he told them he was only 
giving them an easement over the "lower road." (R. Vol. II, P. 388, L. 8-9). Mr. and Mrs. Vance 
later contacted Mr. and Mrs. McKenna (an adjacent landowner) and obtained an easement over 
Buckboard Lane. (R. Vol. II, P. 388, 10-11). When Mr. Cridlebaugh sold Ylr. and Mrs. Sweet 
their property he indicated to them that he was giving them an easement on the upper and the lower 
road. (R. Vol. II, P. 388, L. 3-4). When Dr. and Mrs. Hoch initially purchased their property it was 
their understanding that Mr. Cridlebaugh had given them an easement to the lower road only, and 
not an easement to the upper road. (R. Vol. II, P. 389, L. 8-10). However, by 2008, the Hochs 
believed their warranty deed included an easement on both the lower and the upper road, as well as 
an easement on all existing roads located on the Sweets and Vances property at the time of 
conveyance. (R. Vol. II, P. 389, L. 8-10). This led the Hochs to file suit against the Sweets and 
Vances seeking to enjoin them from interfering with the Hochs use of the upper road and existing 
roads on the defendants properties. (R. Vol. II, P. 386, L. 1-2). 
Course of Proceedings 
On October 21, 2008, Plaintiffs Hoch filed a Verified Complaint to Enjoin Defendants from 
Obstructing Easment. (R. Vol. I, P. 12-35). On October 28, 2008, Defendant Vances filed an 
Answer and Counterclaim. (R. VoL I, P. 36-47). On March 30, 2009, Defendant Sweets filed an 
Answer. (R. Vol. I, P. 48-52). On July 2, 2009, the parties entered into a mediation which resolved 
Defendant Vances counterclaim, but failed to result in a full resolution of the easement dispute. (R. 
Vol. II, P. 386, L. 7). 
On October 21, 2009, Plaintiff Hochs filed a Motion for Summary Judgement (R. Vol. I, 
P. 55-56). On December 28, 2009, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order 
partially granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgement. (R. Vol II, P. 289-298). In this 
Memorandum Decision and Order the District Court found the plaintiffs deed conveyed 
ingress/egress easement rights on the upper road and also conveyed "an easement over and across 
all roadways presently existing on the property herein being conveyed." (R. Vol. II, P. 389, L. 18-20). 
The District Court decision did not determine the precise route or scope of the upper road easement. 
(R. Vol. II, P. 386, L. 17). Nor, did it determine if the road now known as Buckboard Lane was a 
road "presently existing" at the time Cridlebaugh conveyed to Vances the property they now own. 
(R. Vol. II, P. 390, L. 1-2). It is this Memorandum Decision and Order that Defendant Vances have 
appealed. 
All of the parties filed amended pleadings and a Court trial was held on December 12, 13, 
and 14, 2011. (R. VoL II, P. 385, L. 1). The District Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order on February 9, 2012. (R. Vol. II, P. 385-406). In the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, the District Court found Buckboard Lane to be a road that was 
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presently existing at the time of conveyance, and found the scope of the upper road to the be roadway 
as it currently exists from the point that it departs Stagecoach Road to the point that it reaches the 
Hoch property. (R. Vol. II, P. 404, L. 5-10). A Final Judgement was entered on July 9, 2012, and 
appellants filed their notice of appeal on July 25, 2012. (R. Vol. II, P. 411, P. 416). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court error in Granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgement and 
Holding that the Respondents' Warranty Deed Gave them an Express Easement over the 
Upper Road and an Easement Over and Across all Roadways Presently Existing on the 
Appellants Property? 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AND HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS' 
WARRANTY DEED GA VE THEM AN EXPRESS EASEMENT OVER THE UPPER 
ROAD AND AN EASEMENT OVER AND ACROSS ALL ROADWAYS 
PRESENTLY EXISTING ON THE APPELLANTS PROPERTY. 
The District Court misconstrued the Hoch, Sweet, and Vance warranty deeds in holding that 
the warranty deeds conveyed to the Hochs an easement over the upper road and that the Hoch 
warranty deed conveyed easements over and across all roadways presently existing on the property. 
The District Court failed to recognize the limitation Cridlebaugh placed on the easement he 
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conveyed to the Hochs, that being that the one easement he conveyed them was for the purpose of 
ingress and egress. 
A. Standard of Review 
The proper standard of review was summarized by this Court in Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 
212, 280 P.3d 715 (2012). This Court reviews factual findings made after a trial without a jury for 
clear error. Id. P.3d at 720. Findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence will not be disturbed even ifthere is conflicting evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is that 
which a reasonable trier of fact would accept and rely upon it in determining findings of fact. Id. 
However, this Court freely reviews conclusions of law. Id. 
In this case the existence of ambiguity in the warranty deeds will determine the standard of 
review to be applied to the District Court's decision. Id. The legal effect of unambiguous written 
documents are a question of law. Id. Likewise, the determination of whether a document is 
ambiguous or not is also a question of law. Id. "If, however, the instrument of conveyance is 
ambiguous, interpretation of the instrument is a matter of fact for the tier of fact." Id. 280 P.3d at 
720-72 l(quoting Mountainview landowners Coop. Ass 'n v. Cool, 139 Idaho 770, 772, 86 P.3d 484, 
486 (2004)). 
B. The District Court Misconstrued the Warranty Deeds and the Easements Mr. 
Cridlebaugh Conveyed to the Vances, Sweets, and Hochs when it Held that the 
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Respondents had an Easement on the Upper Road and Easements on all 
Existing Roadways on the Vances and Sweets Property. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order dated December 23, 2009, the District Court found 
that the respondents had an express easement over what is commonly referred to as the upper road. 
(R. Vol. II, P. 297, L. 16-18). The District Court relied on three warranty deeds wherein Mr. 
Cridlebaugh conveyed each party to the case their respective property. The three warranty deeds the 
District Court relied on (in order of conveyance) were the Jack Cridlebaugh to Rob and Becky Vance 
warranty deed, the Jack Cridelbaugh to Jake and Audrey Sweet warranty deed, and the Jack 
Cridlebaugh to John and Carol Hoch warranty deed. The District Court held that the three warranty 
deeds were unambiguous and that he did not need to look beyond the deeds to determine the intent 
of the parties. (R. Vol. II, P. 295, L. 8). 
The relevant portions of the Cridlebaugh to Vance Warranty Deed are: 
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way 
to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real property. 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and 
egress running from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are 
appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways 
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed .... 
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SUBJECT TO Perpetual Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and CaroleYN J. 
TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and KAREN RAE 
RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, recorded March, 21, 1995 as 
Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set 
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, 
JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L. 
CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as 
Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
(Pl. Exhibit 105). 
The relevant portions of the Cridlebaugh to Sweet Warranty Deed are: 
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way 
to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real property, including 
but not limited to the easements set forth in that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between 
MIKE T. McHARGUE, an unmarried man, as Grantor, and APC Co., as Grantee, recorded 
Septemberr 4, 1987 under Instrument No. 514248, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, that 
certain Warranty Deed by and between EVERETT CASSELL, also known as EVERETT J. 
CASSELL and BERYL A. CASSELL, husband and wife, as Grantors, and MICHAEL T. 
McHARGUE and MARY C. McHARGUE, husband and wife, as Grantee, recorded April 3, 
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1986 under Instrument No. 497394, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, and that certain 
Easment by and between John Carpenter and Delia Carpenter, husband and wife, parties of 
the first part, and EVERETT J. CASSELL and BERYL A. CASSELL, husband and wife, 
parties of the second part, recorded under Instrument No. 401230, records of Nez Perce 
County, Idaho, and that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between PAUL N. WEINERT and 
GRACE WEINERT, husband and wife, to MIKE T. McHARGUE, a single man, recorded 
under Instrument No. 478091, records ofNez Perce County, Idaho. 
TOG ETHER WITH AN D SUBJECT TO an easement for ingress and egress over and across 
existing roads located on the following described property: The East Half of the Northwest 
Quarter and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter all 
located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, the Grantor 
reserving for himself, his heirs and assigns, said easements. 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and 
egress running from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are 
appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways 
presently existing on property herein being conveyed .... 
SUBJECT TO Perpetual Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and CaroleYN J. 
TIJRNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and KAREN RAE 
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RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, recorded March, 21, 1995 as 
Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set 
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, 
JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L. 
CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as 
Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho ... 
(Pl. Exhibit 106). 
The relevant portions of the Criddlebaugh to Hoch Warranty Deed arc: 
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in the 
following easements: 
1) Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN 
J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and KAREN RAE 
RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, recorded March, 2 I, 1995 as 
Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
2) Easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set forth in a 
document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, JACK 
CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L. CLACK, 
-10-
Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 
622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho ... 
5) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as set 
forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 65867 records of Nez 
Perce County, Idaho. 
6) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as 
reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No. 668025, records 
of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
(Pl. Exhibit 107). 
Express easements may be created by either reservation or exception. Machado, 280 P.3d 
at 721 (citingAkersv. D.L. rVhite Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196, 204 (2005)). An 
express easement by reservation reserves to the grantor some new right in the property being 
conveyed and must be in writing. Id. A writing creating a valid express easement must at a 
minimum identify the land subject to the easement and express the intent of the parties. Id. 280 P.3d 
at 721. There are no magic words required to create an express easement, but the writing must make 
clear the parties intention to establish a servitude. Id. 
The appellants do not dispute that Mr. Cridlebaugh reserved to himself an express easement 
"for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way to the above described real property which 
are appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways 
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presently existing on the property herein being conveyed."(Pl. Exhibit 105). What is disputed is 1) 
the District Court's ruling that Mr. Cridlebaugh conveyed to the appellants an easement over all 
roadways presently existing at the time of the conveyance and 2) the District Court's ruling that the 
warranty deeds were not ambiguous and excluding parole evidence to determine the grantor's intent. 
The District Court interpreted the three conveyances to give the respondents an 
"ingress/egress easement on the upper road and also 'an easement over and across all roadways 
presently existing on the property."' (R. Vol. II, P. 389-3901L17-20& L. 1-2; R. Vol. II, P. 297, L. 
3 ). 1 The District Court erred in construing the warranty deeds in this way. 
Mr. Cridlebaugh conveyed to the appellants all of the easements for ingress and egress he had 
in the property: 
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way 
to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real property. 
Mr. Cridlebaugh then reserved to himself those same easements: 
all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way to the above described 
real property 
1
• Part of the issue in this case is that the Honorable Judge Brudie replaced the Honorable 
Judge Bradbury in the middle of this case and had to interpret how the Honorable Judge 
Bradbury's Memorandum Decision and Order applied as the law of the case to the remaining 
issues at trial. 
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Mr. Cridlebaugh then created a new easement over and across all roadways existing on the property: 
together with an easement over and across all roadways presently existing on the property 
herein being conveyed ... 
(Pl. Exhibit 105). 
Mr. Cridlebaugh then sold the third parcel of property to the respondents. In that deed he 
conveyed to the respondent an easement for the purpose of ingress and egress that he had reserved 
in the appellants' property: 
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in the 
following easements: 
5) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto ... 
(PL Exhibit 107). 
The District Court misconstrued the warranty deeds in holding that Mr. Cridlebaugh 
conveyed to the respondents the easement he created "over and across all roadways." The Hoch 
warranty deed gave the respondents all Mr. Cridlebaugh's interest in the "easement for purpose of 
ingress and egress" that he had reserved in the Sweet and Vance warranty deeds. He did not convey 
to the respondents "easements over and across all roadways presently existing on the property" if 
those roadways were not for the pmpose of ingress and egress. (Pl. Exhibit 105; PL Exhibit 107) 
(Italics added). The respondents' warranty deed clearly limits the easements they received from 
Cridlebaugh to the easement (singular) "for the purpose of ingress and egress." The warranty deed 
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does not state that Mr. Cridlebaugh was giving the respondents all easements and rights in the 
appellants warranty deed, but only the easement that was for the purpose of ingress and egress. 2 
Furthermore, the District Court erred as a matter of law in holding that the easement Mr. 
Cridlebaugh created "over and across all roadways presently existing on the property" was 
appurtenant to the land and not an easement in gross. "There is a difference between easements 
appurtenant and easements in gross." Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 65, 190 P.3d 876, 884 
(2008)(citing West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 556, 511 P.2d 1326, 1332 (1973)). The benefits of 
appurtenant easements serve a parcel ofland. Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 
550, 808 P.2d 1289, 1295 (1991). While easements in gross benefit the holder of the easement 
personally and are not in connection with his ownership of any specific parcel of land. Id 
The easement that Mr. Cridlebaugh created in the Vance warranty deed does not benefit the 
dominant estate. An easement "over and across all existing roadways" does not serve the owner of 
the land because they are not roads that can be used for ingress or egress. The evidence does not 
show how the limited use of Buckboard Lane serves as a benefit to the holder of the estate.3 
lfowever, an easement over existing roadways would serve as a benefit to Mr. Cridlebaugh 
2 Which the District Court found to be both the upper road and the lower road. The 
District Court found that Buckboard Lane was not a part of the upper road and was not used by 
Mr. Cridlebaugh for ingress and egress. (R. Vol. II, 392-393, 19-24 & L. 1-6). 
3 The District Court warned the Hochs that they needed to be cognizant of the limites of 
their easement right on Buckboard Lane. That it did not provide them with access to Stagecoach 
Road because Jack Cridlebaugh never had an easement right on the McKenna portion of 
Buckboard Lane. (R. Vol. II, P. 394, L. 8-15). 
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personally. Mr. Cridlebaugh would benefit from being able to access all existing roadways on 
appellants property while he was marketing the remaining parcels of property he had. The ability 
to go on any existing road would allow him show interested buyers more of the area surrounding the 
property they were interested in buying.4 
Looking at the all three warranty deeds together it is clear that Mr. Cridlebaugh did not 
convey the easement he created "over all roadways presently existing" to the respondents. The 
District Court misconstrued the warranty deeds by failing to recognize the easement Mr. Cridlebaugh 
granted to Mr. and Mrs. Hoch was for the purpose of ingress and egress. 
C. The District Court Erred in Finding that the Warranty Deeds were not 
Ambiguous and in Excluding Parole Evidence to Determine the Intent of the 
Parties. 
If this Court does not find that the Hoch warranty deed plainly did not convey an easement 
"over and across all existing roadways" to the respondents then the appellants have shown a 
conflicting interpretation to the District Courts interpretation of the warranty deed. 
A deed is ambiguous if it is subject to conflicting interpretations. Machado, 280 P.3d at 721. 
"When this Court interprets or construes a deed, 'the primary goal is to seek and give effect to the 
real intention of the parties."' Id. (citing Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217 
(2008)). "If the deed is ambiguous, the tier of fact must' determine the intent of the parties according 
4 (R. Vol. II, P. 294, L. 12-14). 
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to the language of the conveyance and the circumstances surrounding the transaction."' Id. (citing 
Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508, 65 P.3d 525, 530 (2003)). "However, '[i]f the language of a 
deed is plain and unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the deed itself 
and extrinsic evidence is not admissible."' Id. 280 P.3d at 721 (citing Benninger v. Derifield, 142 
Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2008)). When determining ifthe deeds are ambiguous and 
the intent of the parties this Court should look at the three conveyance deeds as a whole. See, Neider 
v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508, 65 P.3d 525, 508 (2003). 
When Mr. Cridlebaugh conveyed his property to Mr. and Mrs. Vance he gave them all 
easements.for ingress and egress runningj/'om public right-o_fway which were appurtenant to the 
property. (Pl. Exhibit 105). Mr. Cridlebaugh reserved those easements to him and his heirs and 
assigns. Mr. Cridlebaugh then went on to create and reserve an additional easement over and across 
all roadways presently existing on the property herein being conveyed. (Pl. Exhibit 105). The 
reservation language in the Cridlebaugh to Sweet warranty deed is the same. (Pl. Exhibit 106). 
The use of the term "roadways" is vague and ambiguous. It is impossible to determine what 
"roadways" the grantor was trying to convey an easement across from the documents themselves. 
The District Court held that the term "roadways" was not ambiguous, but at the same time 
acknowledged the ambiguity in the term when he stated: "I find that there is an issue of fact 
regarding what the parties viewed as a road, that is, whether it had to be passable for a pickup to 
qualify as a road." (R. Vol II, P. 296-297, L. 24 & L. 1-3). The fact that the District Court could not 
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ascertain what parties intended to constitute as "roadways" from the documents means the language 
of the deeds was ambiguous. See, Machado, 280 P.3d 721 (2008) (if the language of a deed is plain 
and unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the deed itself). By holding 
that it could not determine what constituted a "roadway" from the document itself the District Court 
acknowledged the ambiguity of the deed. 
The Hoch warranty deed is also vague and ambiguous in its use of the word easements in two 
of the deeds and the singular tense word easement in one of the deeds. In the Vance warranty deed 
(and the Sweet warranty deed) Mr. Cridelbaugh conveys to the appellants (and Sweets) all easements 
for ingress and egress. (Pl. Exhibit 105). He then reserves to himself reserves to himself all 
easements for ingress and egress. lfowever, Mr. Cridlebaugh used the singular tense word easement 
in his conveyance to Mr. and Mrs. Hoch (easement for the purpose o.f ingress and egress). (Pl. 
Exhibit 107). 
This singular easement could reasonably be interpreted to mean that Mr. Cridlebaugh only 
intended to give Mr. and Mrs. Hoch an easement for the purpose of ingress and egress over one road 
and not multiple roads or multiple easements .5 This interpretation is further supported by the way 
Mr. Cridlebaugh referenced the six documents that gave the Hochs an easement to access his 
property. Four of the six easements specifically listed in the Hoch warranty deed describe the lower 
road easement. Those four easements are: 
5 District Court found that Mr. Cridlebaugh did not intend to give the respondents an 
easement over the upper road. (R. Vol. II, P. 297, L. 12; R. Vol. II, P. 388, L. 5-7). 
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SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in the 
following easements: 
I) Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN 
J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. Rt;CKDASHEL and KAREN RAE 
RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, recorded March, 21, 1995 as 
Instrument No. 596083, records of!'\ez Perce County, Idaho. 
2) Easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set forth in a 
document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN l TURNER, husband and wife, JACK 
CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L. CLACK, 
Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 
622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho ... 
5) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as set 
forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 65867 records of Nez 
Perce County, Idaho. 
6) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as 
reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No. 668025, records 
of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
(Pl. Exhibit 107). 
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It is difficult to determine why Mr. Cridlebaugh used the singular tense of the word easement 
in the Hoch warranty deed without looking to parole evidence to determine what the parties intended 
by the phrase "easement for the purpose of ingress and egress." Did Mr. Cridlebaugh intend to 
convey the respondents an easement over the lower road and nothing else, or did he intend to convey 
them an easement over all ingress and egress roads? Without looking at the testimony of Jack 
Cridlebaugh it is impossible to determine what singular easement he intended to convey to the 
Hochs. The language of the warranty deeds is vague and ambiguous and is subject to conflicting 
interpretations. The District Court erred in excluding Mr. Cridlebaugh's testimony that he did not 
intend to grant the respondents an easement on any road on the appellants or Mr. and Mrs. Sweets 
property except the lower road. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above the Vances respectfully request this Court to reverse the District 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order holding that respondents have an easement over the upper 
road and all existing roadways, including Buckboard Lane, and the Vances request this court remand 
this case back to the District Court with instruction to enter a judgement holding that the respondents 
warranty deed does not convey easements on the upper road or Buckboard Lane. 
In the alternative the Vances respectfully request this Court vacate the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order finding the warranty deeds to be unambiguous and its decision 
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to exclude parole evidence, specifically Jack Cridlebaugh's testimony that he only intended to 
convey to the respondents and easement on the lower road. 
Respectfully submitted this 21'1 day of December, 2012. 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
J~ f ",// By: (j // -W.Jeremy~ 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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